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Heart Attack as Compensable Injury
Marvin D. Silver*
HE ORIGINAL INTENTION of the author was to propose the idea
that a heart attack might be compensable as an occupational
disease. However, after extensive research and deliberation, it
appears evident that the universally accepted construction and
interpretation of the term "occupational disease" is invulnerable
to the inclusion therein of the heart attack incident.
A clear and concise definition of the term "occupational dis-
ease," presenting the requisite elements thereof, is quoted from
the syllabus of Marie v. Standard Steel Works Corp.,' and may,
for our purposes, readily conclude any further consideration of
the cardiac disability as a compensable occupational disease.
The term "occupational disease" is regarded as being
employed in the compensation act in its ordinary and cus-
tomary sense, that is, referring to a disease which is the
natural incident or result of particular employment and is
peculiar to it, usually developing gradually from the effects
of long continued work at the employment, and serving, be-
cause of its known relation to the employment, to attach to
the employment a risk or hazard which distinguishes it from
the ordinary run of occupations and is in excess of that at-
tending employments in general.
The continued high death rate due to heart attacks alone is
of notable concern to the public in general and should be of topi-
cal concern to lawyers, in view of the claims arising therefrom.
In 1950, in Cleveland, Ohio, 3632 deaths due to heart attacks
were reported, of a total 10,020 deaths, a percentage of approxi-
mately 36.2 In 1960, that city reported 3900 deaths due to heart
attacks, of a total 11,061 deaths-again approximately 36 per
cent.3
* A.B., Ohio University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 319 S. W. 2d 871, syl. par. 5 (Mo., 1959). For other judicial constructions
and definitions of "Occupational Disease," see 29 Words and Phrases.
2 Cleveland Div. of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics, Annual Report, 1950.
3 Id., 1960. These reports annually list heart attacks as the number one
cause of the ten main causes of death.
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In order to facilitate the reader's understanding of certain
medical terms used throughout this study, the following defini-
tions are presented.'
myocardial: relating to the myocardium, or heart muscle
4
a
infarction: necrotic changes (pathologic death of cells) re-
sulting from obstruction of an end artery
4b
thrombus: a clot more or less completely occluding a blood
vessel or forming in one of the cavities of the heart
4c
coronary thrombosis: coronary occlusion by thrombus for-
mation . . . usually leading to myocardial infarction
4d
arteriosclerosis: arterial sclerosis; hardening of the arter-
ies; . . .
a. obliterans (type): producing narrowing and occlusion
of the arterial lumen (space in vessel)4e
Usual Strain Doctrine
One of the principal questions in heart attack cases is
whether the strain of an employee's normal duties will support
a compensation award when he suffers a cardiac disability fol-
lowing the performance of such duties. The controlling proposi-
tion in the majority of American courts allows compensation
though the cardiac involvement followed performance of the em-
ployee's regular duties.
The New Jersey court in Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insu-
lator Co., granted compensation to the claimant for an acute myo-
cardial infarction suffered in the performance of an "intermit-
tent" duty at work. In answer to whether recovery was allowed
on the basis that the intermittent work constituted "unusual
strain" causing the "accident," the court explained that:
When heart ravaged by disease succumbs to exertion
arising from doing of employer's work, though it be but a
normal incident of service, in no sense extraordinary, there
is an "accident" within the meaning of the (N. J.) Work-
men's Compensation Act.5
4 Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Unabridged Lawyer's Edition (1961).
4a Id. at p. 992.
4b Id. at p. 766.
4c Id. at p. 1533
4d Id. at p. 1533
4e Id. at p. 152.
5 27 N. J. 127, 141 A. 2d 761, (1958).
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HEART ATTACK AS COMPENSABLE
The opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Heher, clearly
explained the intended construction of the term "accidental in-
jury" in the New Jersey Act,6 citing the controlling English cases
interpreting this identical clause in the English ActJ which
antedated the New Jersey statute. The learned Judge reasonably
presumed that the New Jersey law-making body had in view the
construction theretofore given this clause by the English courts.8
McLain v. Woodbury Board of Education9 involved a claim
for a myocardial infarction suffered by a school superintendent
during a PTA meeting for school integration planning. The court
confirmed the rule that compensatory injury may result from
nervous and emotional strain as well as from physical stress.
Similarly, where an employee in Mississippi suffered a stroke
in the performance of clerical and executive duties, compensation
was allowed. 10 The court determined that when mental and nerv-
ous strain of work is a factor contributing to disability, compen-
sation is recoverable, even though no "immediate, unusual, or
specific" stress or strain at or prior to the injury can be shown.
In Tennessee it is well established that ordinary and usual
exertion at work resulting in injuries is compensable. 11
6 R. S. 34:15-7, N. J. S. A. (1959).
7 The National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, 16 Halsbury's
Statutes of England 797.
8 Partridge Jones & John Paton, Ltd. v. James, A. C. 501 (1933), determined
that the decedent was engaged in doing his ordinary work in a diseased
heart condition, that the work and the disease together contributed to his
death and that this constituted an "accident" which arose out of his em-
ployment. Clover, Clayton & Co., Ltd. v. Hughes, A. C. 242 (1910); Mc-
Ardle v. Gwansea Harbour Trust, 113 L. T. 677, 8 B. W. C. C. 489 (Ct. App.,
1915); Stewart v. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co., Ltd., 5 F. 120 (Ct. Sess., 1902).
9 30 N. J. 567, 154 A. 2d 569 (1959). See also, Coleman v. Andrew Jergens
Co., 65 N. J. Super. 592, 168 A. 2d 265 (1961), where a coronary infarction
suffered by a hypertensive female office worker was held to be com-
pensable.
10 Insurance Dept. of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d
691 (1958). Accord, Shannon v. City of Hazlehurst, 237 Miss. 828, 116 So.
2d 546 (1959); Meridian Mattress Factory, Inc. v. Morris, 239 Miss. 792, 125
So. 2d 533 (1960).
11 Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S. W. 2d 182 (1953);
Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 322 S. W. 2d 432 (1958);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Johnson, 278 F. 2d 200 (6 Cir., Tenn., 1960).
That the injury must be work-connected, see Jakes v. Union Carbide
Nuclear Co., 206 Tenn. 466, 334 S. W. 2d 720 (1960), where compensation
was denied, the employee having died upon arrival "to" work.
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Unusual Strain Doctrine
The basis of this doctrine is that it is necessary to overcome
the inference that a heart ailment is due to "natural causes," and
that, to overcome this inference, it is incumbent upon the claim-
ant to produce evidence of an unusual strain or exertion, event
or happening incidental to but beyond the mere employment
itself, to constitute satisfactory proof of an "accident" within the
meaning of the compensation acts.
Clearly established among the leading proponents of this
doctrine is the state of Ohio, as reaffirmed by the court in Dripps
v. Industrial Commission, wherein it was declared,
The fact that a workman is injured by exerting more
effort or being subjected to a greater strain than is customary
in the performance of his work is not in and of itself suffi-
cient to entitle such workman to participate in the State
Insurance Fund; and before such participation may be had
it must appear that such increased effort or strain was oc-
casioned by some sudden or unusual event.12
Construing the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, the Ohio
courts have denied compensation where the claimant's proof
failed to show that an "external accidental injury" caused the
heart attack. However, the enactment by the Ohio Legislature
in 1959 of an important amendment (to date no heart attack
cases are reported as having applied this amendment) should
provide substantial momentum to the claimant's contention that
the heart attack incident is itself an accidental injury in "char-
acter and result" 13 and thereby compensable.
During the school term in 1958, 54 year old William G. John-
ston, Dean of the University of Denver Law School, died of a
heart attack. In an unreported decision, District Judge Don D.
Bowman reversed a decision of the Colorado Industrial Com-
mission denying a claim for $11,466 for the family of the deceased
Dean, who, according to the determination of the court, "worked
himself to death." 14 However, since the Colorado court in two
12 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N. E. 2d 873, syl. par. 2 (1956). Accord, Swift & Co.
v. Wreede, 110 Ohio App. 252, 168 N. E. 2d 757 (1959); Barrett Div., Allied
Chem. and Dye Corp. v. Owens, 110 Ohio App. 316, 169 N. E. 2d 453 (1960).
13 Ohio Revised Code, sec. 4123.01(C) (amend., 1959), provides, "'Injury'
includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or acci-
dental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of,
the injured employee's employment." For Ohio decisions relating to injury
and pre-existing heart condition, see infra.
14 Johnston v. Industrial Commission (unreported), New York Times, Aug.
12, 1961, p. 21, col. 5.
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later decisions 5 clearly allied that state with the "unusual strain"
rule, we may reasonably assume that Judge Bowman meant that
the Dean "overworked" himself to death.
In Pennsylvania an employee who arrived late to work be-
came involved in a heated argument with his foreman and
after a few minutes on the job, the employee fell dead of a heart
attack. The court refused to allow compensation where no evi-
dence of "physical" force, violence or strain could be shown from
the consequence of either external or internal exertion.16 Con-
trariwise, the Texas court in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hart, de-
termined that the customer's smart-aleck expressions of dissatis-
faction "might well" have been the precipitating factor of the
stroke suffered by the claimant while she attended the customer
in the dry-cleaning establishment. 17
New York's "Exceptional Strain" Rule
During recent years the New York courts have applied a
doctrine in heart attack cases which amounts to a sophisticated
version of the "unusual strain" rule. One of the more recent
decisions' involved a 74 year old handyman employed upon a
country estate who suffered an acute myocardial infarction near
the termination of a number of strenuous chores. The court
accepted from a maze of conflicting medical testimony, the de-
tailed explanation of the claimant's expert, wherein he con-
cluded that the infarction was caused by the work activities on
the day in question and was not due to a culmination of the
underlying, insidiously progressive arteriosclerotic condition in
and of itself.
Dispensing with the appellant's contention that the strain was
not "unusual" compared to that which was normally present in
the claimant's work, the court cited Schechter v. State Insurance
15 Jones v. Industrial Commission, 365 P. 2d 689 (Colo., 1961). The court,
denying compensation to the widow of a 70 year old carpenter who died
on the job, declared that the claimant's evidence failed to support a finding
that the decedent was performing other than the ordinary work of his
trade and that the injury resulted from an accidental strain or accidental
"overexertion." Huff v. Aetna Insurance Co., 360 P. 2d 667 (Colo., 1961),
held that changing a truck tire in the course of employment is a normal
part of the driver's duties and a heart attack suffered in the performance
thereof is not compensable.
16 Hoffman v. Rhoades Constr. Co., 113 Pa. Super. 55, 172 Atl. 33 (1934).
Accord, Baur v. Mesta Machine Co., 195 Pa. Super. 22, 168 A. 2d 591 (1961).
17 315 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App., 1958).
Is Sczesniak v. Whitney, 211 N. Y. S. 2d 581, 12 A. D. 2d 366 (1961).
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Fund,19 wherein it was declared that ". . the claimant may be
subjected to unusual or excessive strain in the course of his
employment despite the fact that the work performed by him
which precipitates the heart attack is one of the same general
type as that in which he is regularly involved," and concluded
that the phrase ". . . 'unusual or excessive strain' . . . is not so
limited in its meaning as to include only work of an entirely
different character from that customarily done; . . . so long as
the conditions of performing the work are such that an excep-
tional strain is imposed on the worker so great that his heart
is affected and damaged thereby, the requirement of unusual or
excessive strain is satisfied." 20
In Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc.,21 compensation
was upheld to the widow of an employee who, after receiving
a scolding from his employer, became worried and upset, suffered
a heart attack and died. The court determined that undue
anxiety, strain and mental stress from work are frequently more
devastating than a mere physical injury.
Injury and Pre-existing Heart Condition
Where an injury combines with a pre-existing heart con-
dition, resulting in disability or death, the previous physical con-
dition is, by the weight of authority, considered unimportant,
and compensation may be allowed even though the heart incident
occurs during the normal duties of employment.
In Lakatos v. Industrial Commission,22 an Ohio Court of
Appeals denied compensation for a heart attack suffered by an
assembly line worker who had a pre-existing heart disease. The
court determined that the work was not different in kind or in
exertion from the regular, ordinary work performed by the
workman and those engaged in like occupations.
19 6 N. Y. 2d 506, 160 N. E. 2d 901 (1959). Here, the claimant's workload
as trial counsel was increased by between 30 to 40% of what it normally
was, and the court determined that the coronary occlusion suffered by the
claimant was compensable.
20 Id. at p. 510.
21 10 N. Y. 2d 209, 176 N. E. 2d 714 (1961). The court in Wagner v. City
Products Corp., 199 N. Y. S. 2d 807, 11 A. D. 2d 551 (1960), awarded com-
pensation on the basis of substantial medical evidence that there was
causal connection between the coronary occlusion which occurred while
the claimant was lifting two 50 pound bags of ice at once, notwithstanding
the work was no more strenuous than work which the claimant normally
performed; the effort was greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life
and was hard physical work.
22 94 Ohio App. 486, 116 N. E. 2d 742 (1952).
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An important Ohio decision was later handed down in
Williams v. Industrial Commission.23 The court, refuting the
defendant's argument that it was essential to the claimant's case
that the employee's death did not result from the "usual" course
of his employment, nonetheless determined that there was sub-
stantial evidence that his death resulted from an internal injury
caused by "over exertion" in moving the heavy rolls without
assistance for an "unusual" distance. However, the court con-
cluded that in the final analysis, the fact that the injury may
occur while the employee is engaged in his "usual" labor is im-
material, where, upon a pre-existing diseased condition there
is an "internal injury" which is received "in the course of em-
ployment" and which directly "arises out of the employment."
However, certain limitations are imposed in some of the
"unusual strain" rule states, as in Prejean v. Bituminous Coal
Cas. Corp.,24 compensation was denied for a coronary occlusion
suffered by a police officer during normal patrol in his car. The
court agreed with the claimant's contention that it is not neces-
sary that the attack be the result of "unusual" physical effort,
if the diseased organ gives way while the claimant is performing
his usual "heavy" duties.
The New York courts apply their "exceptional Strain" rule
to this area and have held that it is immaterial that the exertion
is part of the claimant's normal work if the strain involved is
"more than the ordinary wear and tear of life." 25
Causal Connection-The Main Problem
It is firmly established among the states that it is incumbent
upon the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the prob-
abilities, a causal connection between the employment, or the
exertion occasioned by the employment, and the resulting injury
or death. In heart attack cases, the difficulty of proving causation
is not merely pronounced by the various state constructions of
the terms "accidental injury," "usual strain," "unusual strain,"
23 95 Ohio App. 275, 119 N. E. 2d 126 (1953).
24 125 So. 2d 221 (La. App., 1960). Accord, Finn v. Delta Drilling Co., 121
So. 2d 340 (La. App. 1960), where "heavy" work precipitated or accelerated
a predisposition or disease into becoming a present disability.
25 Stefaniak v. Chudy Paper Co., 206 N. Y. S. 2d 704, 12 A. D. 2d 533
(1960). Accord, Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Industrial Commission, 19
Ill. 2d 236, 166 N. E. 2d 582 (1960); MacDonald's Case, 173 N. E. 2d 925
(Mass., 1961).
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etcetera, but is painfully compounded by the vague and con-
flicting expert medical testimony presented in these cases.
Rorabaugh v. General Mills, Inc.26 involved a claim founded
upon the death of an employee who suffered a coronary occlu-
sion caused by a thrombosis ten minutes after completing
strenuous labor. The court reiterated its long acceptance of the
''usual strain" doctrine but in the light (or perhaps 'shade') of
conflicting medical authority, allowed the non-causal relation-
ship testimony to tip the scale for the employer, where such
testimony did not "feel" that what the decedent was doing
"physically" actually precipitated the appearance of the com-
plication of the thrombosis. Without any medical certainty that
the physical exertion caused the arteriosclerosis or what actu-
ally causes a thrombosis to form, the court was constrained to
allow compensation.
In Harper v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co.,27 compensation
was denied, where no causal connection was held to have been
established between the heart attack suffered by the claimant and
the "type" of work he was doing at the time. The court empha-
sized its adherence to the "usual strain" concept but explained
that had the claimant been engaged in some "strenuous" work,
whether in the normal course of employment or otherwise, it
would have been a circumstance to show "causal-connection."
A particularly interesting case in this area concerned a
laborer who suffered a piece of metal to be lodged in his ear
while cutting scrap. Later the same year, after an operation,
considerable treatment and loss of work, he experienced a cor-
onary thrombosis, which he claimed was caused by his regular
employment, by the stress on his nervous system resulting from
the injury to his ear, and by the anesthetic administered in con-
nection with the ear operation. The court questioned the claim-
ant's argument, to the extent that it would have the courts hold
that anytime an employee, in the course of his regular employ-
ment, suffered a heart attack, his claim should be compensable.
"Perhaps," replied Justice Ward, "due to the conflict and un-
certainties in medical theories relative to the cause of heart
attacks, this contention . . . merits some consideration." 2 8 How-
26 187 Kan. 363, 356 P. 2d 796 (1960).
27 344 S. W. 2d 856 (Ark., 1961).
28 Auto Salvage Co. v. Rogers, 342 S. W. 2d 85 at p. 89 (Ark., 1961). Accord,
C. P. Chaney Sawmill, Inc. v. Robertson, 348 S. W. 2d 703 (Ark., 1961);
(Continued on next page)
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ever, compensation was denied for lack of causal connection, the
court leaving unprovided any implementation of the claimant's
proposal.
In Meridian Mattress Factory, Inc. v. Morris, 29 a 57 year old
bookkeeper suffered a stroke while at work and died of a coro-
nary thrombosis a week later. One of three medical experts testi-
fied unequivocally that in his opinion there was a causal con-
nection between the work of the deceased and the onset of the
heart attack. The other two experts would have prescribed for
the deceased that he "rest rather than work," in view of the
diseased state of his arteries. The court, however, determined
that the evidence was substantial to support the finding that the
work of the employee "aggravated, accelerated and precipitated"
the onset of the coronary thrombosis which resulted in his death,
and that the employer had not met the burden of showing that
there was no causal connection between the work of the deceased
and the onset of the heart attack.
Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co.,3 0 concerned the case of an em-
ployee who, having suffered from severe coronary insufficiency,
experienced an acute coronary occlusion during the course of
his routine duties of employment and died later that day. The
New Jersey court confirmed the principle established in the
Ciuba case, supra, that if the exertions attending the work per-
formed by the decedent contributed to his death, compensation
(Continued from preceding page)
Daniels v. Industrial Accident Commission, 148 Cal. App. 2d 500, 306 P. 2d
905 (1957); Alspaugh v. Mountain States Mutual Cas. Co., 343 P. 2d 697(N. M., 1959), wherein compensation was denied for death occurring three
months after a heart attack suffered during employment, on the grounds
that the "proximity in the time of death to the accident" was insufficient
to justify recovery. Where compensation was allowed for a stroke occur-
ring during sleep, see Joy v. Florence Pipe Foundry Co., 64 N. J. Super. 13,
165 A. 2d 191 (1960).
29 Meridian Mattress Factory, Inc. v. Morris, supra, n. 10. Accord, Shannon
v. City of Hazlehurst, supra, n. 10, wherein compensation was allowed for
the death of a garbage collector found at a place where his duties re-
quired him to be; the employer failing to rebut the presumption that the
death was work-connected, by a showing that the decedent was not en-
gaged in his master's business and that the accident did not arise out
of and in the course of employment.
30 66 N. J. Super. 469, 169 A. 2d 499 (1961). Accord, Tritschler v. Merck &
Co., 66 N. J. Super. 116, 168 A. 2d 666 (1961), wherein medical testimony
established that the decedent's coronary occlusion occurred purely in the
natural course of the underlying disease while the decedent was working
at his desk, and the fact that he collapsed and died after "walking to the
company infirmary" did not bring the heart attack within the compensable
sphere of "accidents arising out of and in the course of employment."
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
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should be allowed, as it is not necessary that an "unusual" strain
be proved. However, in denying compensation, the court, fear-
ing to equate the word "accident" with the word "employment,"
concluded that death from heart disease is presumably the result
of natural physiological causes and that the burden is upon the
claimant to establish by a "preponderance of the probabilities"
that the employment was "at least" a contributing cause of the
death; but that the facts in the case permitted of "no inference"
that but for the work performed by the decedent he would not
have died when and as he did. The court accepted as the sole
cause of the decedent's death the physiological damage result-
ing from the severe heart attack he suffered "at home" two days
prior to the fatal occlusion, and which attack continued without
interruption or abatement.
As the golfing season approaches, notice might be made of
Messe-rsmith's Case,31 wherein the court considered that a heart
attack while playing golf, if in the course of and arising out of
employment, may be compensable.
Conclusion
It is apparent from the cases presented by this study that
the compensability of a heart incident ultimately depends upon
the expert medical testimony relating to the issue of causation
and the effect given by the court thereto.
Speaking at the Annual Meeting, California Heart Associa-
tion, Dr. Douglas A. Campbell, Referee, California Industrial
Commission, noted that,
It is an unfortunate fact that as soon as litigation enters
the picture, scientific procedures and attitudes become di-
luted by partisan enthusiasm, with the result that opinions
as to the effect of an accused event upon a subsequent heart
episode are produced more for their economic value than
for scientific worth. Until the medical profession has clearer
and more universally recognized concepts of cause and
effect, it is and will remain difficult to reconcile the results
desired by those seeking to rehabilitate industrially the
cardiac patient and the fears of industry of an adverse effect
upon compensation costs.
3 2
81 340 Mass. 117, 163 N. E. 2d 22 (1959).
32 Campbell, Heart Disease and Compensability Under Workmen's Com-
pensation, J. Occup. Med. 71-74 (Feb. 61).
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Dr. Campbell quoted from an article prepared for a similar
meeting before the Washington State Heart Association, with
which I would like to summarize.
It is probably true that, viewed from the physician's
standpoint, courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on
similar or even identical factual patterns. But a careful case
by case review of . . . decision (sic) will reveal that any
seeming inconsistencies have resulted not so much from in-
consistent application of rules of law as from variant medical
opinions expressed in various cases. To one who understands
the judicial process, inconsistent results may be expected
where ostensibly qualified medical experts express contrary
opinions regarding factual situations .... 3
33 Id. at p. 73, from Wilbur, When is a Heart Case Compensable?
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1962
